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Abstract
This paper presents first the estimation of a two-country DSGE model for the euro area 
and the rest-of-the-world including relevant oil-price channels. We then investigate the 
optimal resolution of the policy tradeoffs emanating from oil-price disturbances. Our 
simulations show that the inflationary forces related to the use of oil as an intermediate 
good seem to require specific policy actions in the optimal allocation. However, the 
direct effects of oil prices should be allowed to exert their mechanical influence on CPI 
inflation and wage dynamics through the indexation schemes. We also illustrate that any 
fine-tuning strategy which tries to counteract the direct effects of oil-price changes in 
headline inflation would prove counterproductive both in terms to stabilization of 
underlying inflation and by causing unnecessary volatility in the macroeconomic 
landscape. Finally, it appears that perfect foresight on future oil price developments 
allows a more rapid absorption of the steady state decline in purchasing power and real 
national income in the optimal allocation. Through the various expectation channels, 
economic agents facilitate the necessary adjustments and optimal monetary policy can 
still tolerate the direct effects of oil price changes on CPI inflation as well as some degree 
of underlying inflationary pressures in the view of easing partly the burden of downward 
real wage shifts. Our monetary policy prescriptions have been derived in a modeling 
framework where oil-price fluctuations are essentially exogenous to policy actions and 
where expectations are formed under the rational expectations paradigm. Notably, the 
extension of such conclusions to imperfect knowledge and weak central bank credibility 
configurations remain challenging fields for further research. 
Keywords: Oil prices, Optimal monetary policy, New open economy macroeconomics, 
Bayesian estimation. 
JEL Classification: E4, E5, F4. 5
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Non-Technical Summary
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the optimal stabilization plans for monetary policy in the
face of exogenous oil-price shocks. This issue is treated ﬁrst through the estimation of a two-country
DSGE model for the euro area and the rest-of-the-world including relevant oil-price channels. Once the
structural modeling framework is given satisfying data coherence, we then derive some concepts of op-
timal monetary policy setting and investigate the optimal resolution of the policy tradeoffs emanating
from oil-price disturbances.
Four main oil-channels are introduced in the model: oil is serving ﬁnal consumption; it is also used
as an intermediate input in domestic ﬁrms’ production; we allow for a mechanical real income effect
of oil price changes through rule-of-thumb consumers that spend a ﬁxed proportion of their current
nominal income; ﬁnally, we account for the "recycling" of oil revenues into euro area and ROW exports
through the introduction of a reduced-form oil-producing block. Obviously, the description of the oil-
market functioning used in this paper is very stylized. However, the simplifying assumptions made
here should not signiﬁcantly affect the main results of the paper regarding the optimal design of mone-
tary policy in the face of exogenous oil-supply shocks.
The original contributions of the paper cover several dimensions. First we provide some evidence on
the macroeconomic transmission of oil price shocks to the euro area within an open-economy structural
modeling framework featuring rational expectations. The estimated model points to implications of oil
price shocks for economic activity which are on the lower bound of available estimates, mostly based
on empirical agnostic models. We provide indications that the rational expectations and perfect central
bank credibility assumptions may explain such more moderate propagation to real variables. In terms
of structural inference, we estimate the share of rule-of-thumb consumers for the euro area to be around
20% whereas the elasticities of substitution of oil as an input in ﬁnal consumption and aggregate pro-
duction prove to be weakly identiﬁed given our macroeconomic dataset.
Second, we compare the stabilization properties of the estimated rules to the ones implied by opti-
mal monetary policy conduct. It turns out that the optimal monetary policy would call for a more
pronounced contraction of economic activity in order to mitigate signiﬁcantly the indirect inﬂationary
pressures at the producer level, notably through weaker wage responses. In addition, the optimal coop-
eration would activate a stronger exchange rate channel to ease the cost pressures generated by oil-price
increases. Actually, the inﬂationary forces emanating from the intermediate consumption of oil require
speciﬁc policy actions in the optimal allocation while the direct effects of oil prices should be allowed to
exert their mechanical inﬂuence on CPI inﬂation and wage dynamics through the indexation schemes.
We also illustrate that any ﬁne-tuning strategy trying to counteract the direct effects of oil-price changes
in headline inﬂation would prove counterproductive both in terms of stabilization of underlying inﬂa-
tion and by causing unnecessary volatility in the macroeconomic landscape.6
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1 Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to explore the monetary policy prescriptions emanating from optimal
policy conduct in a DSGE framework which provides satisfying data coherence for the euro area.
An abundant literature has examined the macroeconomic implications of oil price ﬂuctuations from
both an empirical as well as structural perspective. Somewhat related to our work, Blanchard and Galí
[2007] notably provided monetary policy considerations regarding the appropriate stabilization of oil
price shocks. For the euro area, Jacquinot et al. [2009] developed a calibrated large scale DSGE model
with a special focus on the energy sector while De Fiore and Lombardo [2008] explore the gains from
international monetary policy cooperation in response to oil-price disturbances.
Recent advances in Bayesian estimation techniques make it possible to estimate relatively large struc-
tural Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. In this respect, the core foundations of
the present model are inherited from Adjemian et al. [2008] who brought to data a two-country DSGE
model for the US and the euro area. The model shares many features common in open-economy DSGE
models. Notably, exchange rate pass-through is incomplete due to some partial nominal rigidity in the
buyer’s currency. We also introduce a number of nominal and real frictions such as sticky prices, sticky
wages, variable capital utilization costs and habit persistence, following the seminal contribution from
Smets and Wouters [2003]. Regarding the inclusion of oil, four main channels have been identiﬁed: oil
is serving ﬁnal consumption; it is also used as an intermediate input in domestic ﬁrms’ production; we
allow for a mechanical real income effect of oil price changes through rule-of-thumb consumers, which
spend a ﬁxed proportion of their real income each period; ﬁnally, we account for the "recycling" of oil
revenues into euro area and ROW exports through the introduction of a reduced-form oil-producing
block. Obviously, the description of the oil-market functioning used in this paper is very stylized. How-
ever, the simplifying assumptions should not signiﬁcantly affect the main results of the paper regarding
the optimal design of monetary policy in the face of exogenous oil-supply shocks.
Concerning optimal policy, the Ramsey approach to optimal monetary policy cooperation is computed
by formulating an inﬁnite-horizon Lagrangian problem of maximizing the conditional aggregate wel-
fareof both countries subject to the full set ofnon-linear constraints forming the competitive equilibrium
of the model. We solve the equilibrium conditions of the optimal allocation using second-order approx-
imations to the policy function. We consider two concepts of optimal policy: one is the fully optimal
monetary policy cooperation; the other consists in maximizing euro area welfare conditional on mone-
tary policy in the ROW following the estimated Taylor rule. We thereby put into perspective the optimal
international monetary policy cooperation with an optimal policy from an euro area perspective, treat-
ing the ROW block as a reduced-form one.
The original contributions of the paper cover several dimensions. First, we provide some evidence on
the macroeconomic transmission of oil price shocks to the euro area within an open-economy structural
modeling framework featuring rational expectations. The estimated model points to implications of oil
price shocks for economic activity which are on the lower bound of available estimates, mostly based7
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on empirical agnostic models. We provide evidence that the rational expectations and perfect central
bank credibility assumptions may explain such more moderate propagation to real variables. In terms
of structural inference, we estimate the share of rule-of-thumb consumers for the euro area to be around
20%. While estimated shares of oil absorption in the economy are reasonable, the elasticities of substi-
tution of oil as input in ﬁnal consumption and aggregate production prove to be weakly identiﬁed with
the macroeconomic dataset used.
Second, we compare the stabilization properties of the estimated rules to the ones implied by optimal
monetary policy conduct. Under both policy regimes, the direct effectsof oil prices should be allowed to
exert their mechanical inﬂuence on CPI inﬂation and wage dynamics through the indexation schemes.
However, the optimal monetary policy would call for a more pronounced contraction of economic ac-
tivity in order to mitigate signiﬁcantly the indirect inﬂationary pressures at the producer level, notably
through weaker wage responses. In addition, the optimal cooperation would activate a stronger ex-
change rate channel to ease the cost pressures generated by oil-price increases. We also illustrate that
any ﬁne-tuning strategy which attempts to counteract the direct effects of oil-price changes in headline
inﬂation would prove counterproductive both in terms of stabilization of underlying inﬂation and by
factoring unnecessary volatility in the macroeconomic landscape. Finally, we explore the optimal policy
response to an expected oil-price surge. It appears that perfect foresight on future oil price developments
leads to a more rapid absorption of the steady state decline in purchasing power and real national in-
come. Through the various expectation channels, economic agents facilitate the necessary adjustments
and optimal monetary policy can tolerate the directeffectsof oil price changes on CPI inﬂation as well as
some degree of underlying inﬂationary pressures in the view of easing partly the burden of downward
real wage shift.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the theoretical model is derived. Section 3
presents the estimation of the model and the inference made on the transmission of oil prices in the euro
area. Section 4 deals with the derivation of optimal policy and the analysis of the optimal stabilization
of oil-price shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The world economy is composed of two symmetric countries, Home and Foreign, and a residual oil-
producing block where we abstract from sound micro-economic foundations. In H and F,t h e r ei s
a continuum of "single-good-ﬁrms" producing differentiated goods that are imperfect substitutes. The
number of households is proportional to the number of ﬁrms. Consumers receive utility from consump-
tion and disutility from labor. In each country, the consumption baskets aggregating products from both
countries have biased preferences towards locally produced goods. Concerning international frictions,
we assume that ﬁnancial markets are complete both domestically and internationally. We restrict the
model to the perfect risk-sharing case in order to abstract from the interactions between the oil price
effects on external accounts and the exchange rate risk premium (see Bodenstein et al. [2007]o nt h i s8
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issue)1. Finally, export prices are sticky in the producer currency for a fraction of ﬁrms and in the buyer
currency for the remaining ﬁrms.
Regarding the speciﬁcation of oil-related channels, the oil price affects the economy through four differ-
ent mechanisms. First, oil is, inter alia, a consumption good and thus the price of energy-related items
directlyaffectsthe consumer price basket. Second, thereis an indirectchannel coming from the use of oil
as an input in the domestic ﬁrms’ production function. Oil is very much complementary to capital such
that a rise in the oil price will increase the cost of production and lead to some substitution towards less
capital intensive production. We also allow for rule-of-thumb consumers which mechanically spend a
ﬁxed proportion of their current nominal income. This featurehelps capturing a mechanical real income
effectof oil price changes on households’ spending. Finally, there is a feedback effectat the international
level coming from the "recycling" of higher revenues obtained by oil-exporting countries in the wake of
an oil price increase. These higher revenues are partly redirected towards the euro area via higher im-
port demand.
The oil-producing country is treated as an ad hoc reduced-form block: the oil-producing country has a
ﬁxed exchange rate with country F; the real price of oil in terms of country F consumer prices is ex-
ogenously determined while oil supply adjusts to clear the market (Bodenstein et al. [2007]m a d et h e
same assumption); and oil revenues are gradually recycled into imports form country H and F.S u c h
a description of the oil market is obviously very stylized and neglects important features of oil price
dynamics. First, we do not account for the oil-producing industries in country H and F. Second, real oil
prices can be expected to react to economic conditions beyond the narrow scope of oil-supply determi-
nants. Third, the empiricalliteratureon oil priceshas emphasizedthe importance of non-linear patterns.
However, given that our estimation procedure only makes use of ﬁrst-order model dynamics, we could
not introduce such non-linear features. Moreover, up to a ﬁrst order, our simulations suggests that a
market-clearing condition determining oil prices, subject to exogenous oil-supply shocks, would only
generate a limited contribution of non oil-related shocks to the real oil price dynamics. The amplitude
of historical oil price ﬂuctuations can hardly be reproduced by macroeconomic shocks through a linear-
approximation of the model including endogenous oil price determination (which is consistent with the
simulations reported by Jacquinot et al. [2009]). Finally, the primary focus of the paper deals with the
optimal design of monetary policy in the face of "exogenous" oil price shocks and we prefer to pursue
the discussion under the assumption that the monetary authorities do not have a control on oil price
determination. We leave for further research the analysis of optimal monetary cooperation in the case of
endogenous oil prices, and potentially non-linear supply constraints, which would create strong incen-
tives for monetary policy to exploit its leverage on oil-price formation. Therefore, while acknowledging
that there are limitations to our assumptions about the oil-market, they should not signiﬁcantly affect
the core results of the paper2.
1We leave for further research the analysis of optimal monetary policy stabilization of oil price shock in presence of inter-
national ﬁnancial frictions. Obviously, the implications regarding the optimal exchange rate adjustment could be signiﬁcantly
affected.
2We also re-estimated the benchmark model presented in the following sections assuming that a market-clearing condition
determines real oil prices in the presence of exogenous oil-supply shocks. The parameter estimates remain very similar and the9
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Thereafter, we present the main decisions problems of economic agents, leaving the complete descrip-
tion of equilibrium conditions to the Appendix. Most of the derivation will be pursued for country H.
2.1 Households decision problem
We assumethat in each country, thereexists a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households. Afraction1−ωr
of households in each country H (resp. 1 − ω∗
r in country F) derives its consumption and investment
plans from an optimizing program, those households being referred thereafter as o − type households,
while the remaining share of households, the r −type households, follow a rule-of-thumb consumption
behavior.




























Households obtain utility from consumption, Ch
t , relative to an internal habit depending on past con-
sumption, while receiving disutility from their labour services Lh
t .F o r h ∈ [0,ω r], households are of
r − type with consumption and labor supply denoted Cr
t and Lr
t, while, for h ∈ [0,ω r], households are
of o−type with the analogous notations Co
t and Lo
t. The utility function also incorporates a consumption
preference shock εB
t . ˜ L is a positive scale parameter.
2.1.1 Optimizing households
o − type households have access to ﬁnancial markets which are assumed to be complete both domesti-
cally and internationally. They also own the productive capacities and make decisions on investment
plans to build the capital stock which will be rented out to intermediate ﬁrms.
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share of oil-price variance explained by non-oil related shocks is well-below 10% (results not reported here).10
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represents the return on the real capital stock minus the cost associated with variations in the degree
of capital utilization. The income from renting out capital services depends on the level of capital aug-
mented for its utilization rate. The cost of capacity utilization is zero when capacity are fully used
(Φ(1) = 0). A
o,h
t is a stream of income coming from state contingent securities which are traded among
households to provideinsurance against household-speciﬁc wage-income risk. This assumption implies
that all o − type households choose identical allocations in equilibrium.
We also introduce a consumption tax which affects the price of the distributed goods serving ﬁnal con-
sumption. Such a basket consists of non-oil distributed goods and oil quantities. The after-taxconsumer
price index (CPI) is denoted Pt =( 1+τC,t)Pt where P t is the price of the distribution good gross of
consumption tax. Such a time-varying consumption tax could in principle rationalize the CPI inﬂation




Investment is purchased out of non-oil distributed goods production with price PN,t.
Separability of preferences and complete ﬁnancial markets ensure that households have identical con-
sumption plans.
2.1.2 Investment decisions of optimizing households
In each country, the capital is owned by optimizing households and rented out to the intermediate ﬁrms
at a rental rate Rk
t . Households choose the capital stock, investment and the capacity utilisation rate
in order to maximize their intertemporal utility function subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
and the capital accumulation equation given by:
K
o
















where δ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate, S is a non negative adjustment cost function such that S (1) = 0
and εI
t is an efﬁciency shock on the technology of capital accumulation.
The functional form used thereafter is S (x)=φ/2( x − 1)




r−type households areassumed to consume their total current income. Such households do not smooth
consumption and do not substitute intertemporally in the face of ﬂuctuations in real interest rates. They
do not have access to international bond trading and do not supply rental income from capital services.
Accordingly, the level of consumption will be equal to gross income net of taxes and transfers. In the


















t is a stream of income coming from state contingent securities which insures the consumers
against the income risk of the wage distribution, while TT
r,h
t denote government lump-sum transfers
(or taxes if negative). Notice that the transfers to rule-of-thumb households can differ from those to the
optimizing households. In practice, we assume active ﬁscal transferswhich redistributenational income
so that aggregate consumption of rule-of-thumb households is linked to real national income.
The point here is to specify hand-to-mouth behavior not restricted to labour income. Some ﬁxed (nega-
tive) transfers are set to equalize the level of consumption for the two types of households in the steady
state. The time-varying net transfers to rule-of-thumb consumers are ﬁnanced through lump-sum taxes
on o − type consumers.
2.2 Labour supply and wage-setting by unions
Moreover, each household represents a differentiated labor service and we consider a continuum of
unions, each of which representing workers of a certain type. Unions act as a monopoly supplier of the
different labor types. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that they sell their services to a perfectly
competitive ﬁrm which transforms it into an aggregate labor input using the following technology
Lt =






where μw = θw
θw−1 and θw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor services.














is the aggregate wage rate.
We assume that the fraction of rule-of-thumb and optimizing consumers is uniformly distributed ac-




Inaddition,unions settheirwagesonastaggeredbasis. Eachperiod,everyunionfacesaconstant proba-
bility 1−αW ofchanging its wage   Wt(h), which will bethe sameforallsuppliers oflaborservices. Other-




with Πt = Pt
Pt−1. Unions might not be able to choose their nominal wage optimally in the near fu-
ture. Thus,   Wt(h) is chosen to maximize the weighted average of intertemporal utility across house-
holds types, given the budget constraint and the labor demand for wage setters which are unable to






2.3 Firms decision problems
2.3.1 Distribution goods
Various distribution sectors deliver two types of goods to the economy. First, some distribution ﬁrms
produce a "non-oil goods" basket which aggregates ﬁnal goods produced locally and imported. This12
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output serves as an investment good and is also an input to another distribution sector which produces
a consumption good aggregating non-oil goods with oil.
Regarding ﬁrst non-oil goods, a continuum of companies operating under perfect competition mixes
local production of ﬁnal goods with imports. There is a home bias in the aggregation, which pins down



































ξ is the elasticity of substitution between bundles YH and YF. The degrees of home bias are subject to













































Similarly, a continuum of companies operating under perfect competition mixes non-oil domestic goods































In country H, ﬁnal producers for local sales and imports are in perfect competition and aggregate a
continuum of differentiated intermediate products from home and foreign intermediate sector. YH and
YF are sub-indexes of the continuum of differentiated goods produced respectively in country H and
F. The elementary differentiated goods are imperfect substitutes with an elasticity of substitution de-
noted
μ
μ−1. Final goods are produced with the following technology YH =











. In the country F, the corresponding indexes are given by Y ∗
F =













. For a domestic product h,w ed e n o t ep(h) its price on local market and p∗(h) its13
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price on the foreign import market. The domestic-demand-based price indexes associated with imports
andlocal marketsin both countries aredeﬁnedasPH =


























. Domestic demand is allocated across the dif-









































Intermediate goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology mixing labor and a CES composite
of capital services   Kt(•)=ut(•)Kt(•) and oil:
h ∈ [0,1], Yt(h)=EA




(1 − ωY )
1











t is an exogenous technology shock. Each ﬁrm sells its products both in the local and foreign
market.
Firms are monopolistic competitors and produce differentiatedproducts. For local sales, ﬁrms set prices
on a staggered basis àl aCalvo (1983). In each period, a ﬁrm h (resp. f) faces a constant probability
1 − αH (resp. 1 − α∗
F) of being able to re-optimize its nominal price. This probability is independent























































tPt+j is the marginal value of one unit of money to the o − type households. MCt+j is
the real marginal cost deﬂated by the interior-producer-price and τt is a time-varying tax on ﬁrm’s rev-
enue. Due to our assumptions on the labor market and the rental rate of capital, the real marginal cost
is identical across producers. We introduce a time varying tax on ﬁrms’ revenue that is affected by an






Concerning exports, we assume that, in country H,af r a c t i o nη (respectively η∗ in country F)o fe x -
portersexhibitproducer-currency-pricing(PCP)while theremainingﬁrms exhibitlocal-currency-pricing14
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(LCP). LCP exporters denominate their price in foreign currency and face nominal rigidities similar to
the ones affecting local producers in the foreign country.






















































PH ,R˜ ERF =
˜ PF
SP∗
F and ˜ T =
˜ PF
PH . Export margins




PH and RERF =
PF
SP∗
F . In the case of international price





PN,t is the real exchange rate measured with non-oil consumer price indices.
2.5 Oil producing country
The oil producing country has ﬁxed exchange rate with country F. The budget constraint of the oil








OH,t + P ∗
F,tO∗
F,t = P ∗
oil,t
 





where Yoil,t and Y ∗
oil,t are aggregate demand quantities from country H and F,a n dw h e r eOH,t and O∗
F,t
are demands of non-oil goods demand produced in country H and F respectively.
The oil producer has a rule of thumb consumption behavior. The long term allocation of imports is con-
sistent with a balanced budget (BO
F =0 ) and Cobb-Douglas preferences reﬂecting the relative country
sizes. We assume that imports are adjusted only gradually towards the Cobb-Douglas allocation. The
recycling of oil revenues into non-oil goods imports is therefore given by




























The relative price of oil in terms of pre-tax consumer prices in country F, T ∗
oil,t, is treated as exogenous
in the model and subject to shocks. Supply of oil adjusts to price and demand conditions without costs.
2.6 Government
In country H, public expenditures G are subject to random shocks εG
t . The government ﬁnances public
spending with various taxes and lump-sum transfers.15
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The government also controls the short term interest rate Rt. Monetary policy is speciﬁed in terms of an
interest rate rule: the monetary authority follows generalized Taylor rules which incorporate the level
and ﬁrst difference of inﬂation and output gap, deﬁned as the deviation between actual and ﬂexible-
price output. Such reaction functions also incorporate a non-systematic component εR
t .
Written in deviation from the steady state, the interest feedback rule used in the estimation has the form:





where small case variables denote log-deviation from their deterministic steady-state.
3 The transmission of oil-price shocks to the euro area in the esti-
mated model
In this section, we describe the Bayesian estimation of the ﬁrst order approximation of the model pre-
sented in the ﬁrst section, on a euro area (EA) and rest-of-the-world (ROW) dataset. Thereafter, country
H represents the euro area and country F, the rest-of-the-world. We make therefore the simplifying
assumptions that oil prices are denominated in ROW’s currency and that no domestic oil-production
takes place in the EA and in the ROW.
For the euro area, we consider 8 key macroeconomic quarterly time series from 1975q1 to 2005q4 (series
from 1970q1to 1974q4 were used as a training sample): output, consumption, investment, employment,
realwages, GDP deﬂator inﬂation rate,CPI inﬂation rateand3month short-term interestrate3. The euro
area dataset is taken from Fagan et al (2001) and Eurostat. The exchange rate is the synthetic nominal
effectiveexchange rate of the euro (see OECD source). Regarding the rest of the world variables, foreign
output is given by the average of real GDP of euro area trade partners, weighted by the euro areaexport
structure. The derivation of this aggregate can be found in Dees et al. [2007]. Foreign CPI is proxied by
the average of CPI inﬂation rates aggregated with a double-weight structure consistent with the nom-
inal effective exchange rate (see OECD source). Finally, the foreign interest rate is a weighted average
of 3-month nominal interest rates for selected countries (given data limitations, we used series from US,
Canada, UK, Switzerland and Japan). We account for oil as an intermediate input in the deﬁnition of the
value added deﬂator and quantity through the measurement equations for GDP deﬂator inﬂation and
real GDP, in a log-linear form4.
3As in Smets and Wouters [2005], hours are linked to the number of people employed e∗
t with the following dynamics:
et = βEtet+1 +
(1 − βλe)(1 − λe)
λe
(lt − et)
4The technology structure speciﬁed in the model does not allow for a value added concept consistent with national accounts.
Therefore, we linked real GDP and GDP deﬂator inﬂation to the state variables through the following log-linear relations:










(nπH,t − (1 − n)(π∗
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Given the dataset considered, we allow for as many shocks as variables. The exogenous disturbances
introduced in the estimation can be divided into three categories:
• Efﬁcient shocks: AR(1) shock on technology (ǫA
t ), investment (ǫI










t ), and AR(1) shock on international risk sharing (ǫ∆S
t , see section A.1 of in the Appendix for a
deﬁnition of the shock).
• Policy shocks: shocks on interest rate policy rules (ǫR
t , ǫR∗
t ).
• Oil-price shock: AR(1) shock on the log-real oil price deﬂated by ROW CPI (ǫ∗
oil,t).
To account for the ROW variables, we introduced a public expenditure shock, a markup shock and a
monetary policy shock. An alternative set of shocks could have been envisaged but since we focus on
the transmission of an oil-price shock and assume exogenous dynamics for it, our results are not cru-
cially sensitive along this dimension of the model.
One speciﬁc aspect of the estimation regards the pre-ﬁltering of variables. In previous papers for the
euro area (see Smets and Wouters [2005], Adjemian et al. [2007], Adjemian et al. [2008] or Christoffel
et al. [2007]),differentapproacheshave been followed: quantities were assumed to featureeither model-
consistent deterministic trends or variable-speciﬁc observational trends; inﬂation and interest rate were
either detrended prior to estimation or assumed to be stationary. In the later case, the sample mean for
euro area inﬂation can be constrained by tight priors to be close to a steady state level of 2% annually
which is consistent with the ECB’s quantitative deﬁnition of price stability. Here, we propose to test
for mean-breaks in the inﬂation rates, interest rates and growth rates of real variables and then remove
those effects from the series prior to estimation. We implemented the multiple breaks test procedure of
Altissimo and Corradi [2003], since it takes into account sample size when computing critical values.
The only breaks present concern euro area inﬂation rates, and interest rates for both the euro area and
the rest of the world (see in the appendix). All real data are then converted in log-level and detrended
before estimation. The foreign inﬂation rate is also detrended.
Interestingly, the last period breaks for euro area inﬂation and nominal interest rate point to a steady
state inﬂation rate of around 2% annually and a steady state nominal interest rate of around 4%. The
pre-ﬁltering applied to inﬂation and interest rate gives thereforesensible steady state values for the euro
area. If the econometrician prefers to abstract from such adjustments, this would support the case for
tight priors on the mean of those variables in order to capture better the properties of the data over the
last decade (see Christoffel et al. [2007]). Concerning the estimation results presented in this section, we
replicated the analysis with linear detrending for inﬂation and nominal interest rates and found very
similar results (not reported here).
Regarding the parameter set, we impose a substantial degree of symmetry in the economic behavior of
the euro area and the ROW: given the limited dataset used for the ROW, few parameters on this block17
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will be estimated, constraining the others to be the same as in the euro area. The estimated parameters
in the ROW block are related to the Euler equation, the nominal rigidity in the goods market and the
Taylor rule. Such coefﬁcients are the ones which are the most likely to be identiﬁed by data on output,
inﬂation and interest rate. For the same reason, we did not introduce rule-of-thumb consumers in the
ROW block. Moreover, we speciﬁed the CPI inﬂation rate as a target variable in the Taylor rule for the
ROW but the GDP deﬂator inﬂation rate in the euro area interest rate rule. Given that the main focus of
the paper concerns the transmission of oil prices, we preferredto specify the EA feedback rule in a form
which does not feature any systematic response to direct inﬂationary effects of oil prices. However, in
order to improve the identiﬁcation of the Taylor rule coefﬁcients for the ROW, we kept the CPI inﬂation
rate since it is the only observed inﬂation rate in the estimation exercise.
Finally, we contrast the direct estimations of various model speciﬁcations with their corresponding
DSGE-VAR inference. We closely follow the econometric approach used by Del Negro et al. [2007]
which provide a detailed exposition of the method. Basically, the authors build the priors of a BVAR
model from a DSGE model and evaluate the optimal weight of the DSGE priors. The posterior density
is obtained from the likelihood function by augmenting the sample with artiﬁcial data generated by the
DSGE model. The relative size of the artiﬁcial is denoted λDSGE. The perspective of the DSGE-VAR
estimation is particularly useful in assessing the robustness of the structural inference, the identiﬁca-
tion of parameters and the possible misspeciﬁcations in the macroeconomic transmission of oil prices
embodied in our model.
3.1 Calibrated parameters and prior distributions
Some parameters are ﬁxed prior to estimation. This concerns generally parameters driving the steady
state values of the state variables for which the econometric model including detrended data is quasi
uninformative. Those parametersare assumed to be the same for the euro areaand the rest of the world.
The discount factor β is calibrated to 0.99, which implies annual steady state real interest rates of 4%.
The depreciation rate δ is equal to 0.0025per quarter. Markups are 1.3 in the goods market and 1.5 in the
labor market. The steady state is consistent with a labor income share in total output of 60%. Actually,






Sharesof consumption and investment in total steady stateoutput arerespectively 0.65and0.18. Finally,
we sent the level of home bias n to 0.875 so that the steady state openness ratio for the euro area is close
to the sample average.
The steady state oil import shares in ﬁnal consumption and in the production of intermediate goods
are determined by the parameters of the CES aggregators: ωY for the productive technology and ωC for
the ﬁnal consumption basket. In the benchmark estimation, those parameters are calibrated. For the
elasticity of substitutions, θo and ξo,w et a k et h ev a l u eu s e db yBackus and Crucini [2000], setting them
at 0.09. This implies a relative complementarity between on the one hand, oil consumption and the rest
of household expenditures, and on the other hand, between the oil input and ﬁxed capital. The other
parameters are then chosen to map the very short-term elasticity of euro area HICP with respect to oil
prices and the average share of nominal oil imports over nominal GDP over the last 15 years. We esti-18
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Tab. 1: Benchmark model: parameter estimates for exogenous processes.
DSGE DSGE-VAR
Param Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs A posteriori beliefs
Distribution Mean Std. Mode Mean I1 I2 Mode Mean I1 I2
 
A
t Uni 5 2.89 0.78 0.85 0.59 1.11 0.57 0.62 0.41 0.82
 
B
t Uni 5 2.89 1.53 2.80 1.05 4.87 1.95 2.26 1.02 3.49
 
G
t Uni 5 2.89 1.73 1.76 1.56 1.96 1.26 1.27 1.08 1.44
 
I
t Uni 5 2.89 6.47 6.66 5.30 8.03 4.87 4.95 3.88 6.05
 
W
t Uni 5 2.89 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.19
 
P
t Uni 5 2.89 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.29 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.23
 
CPI
t Uni 5 2.89 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.31 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.22
 
R
t Uni 5 2.89 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.15
 
G∗
t Uni 5 2.89 3.11 3.19 2.78 3.58 1.93 1.94 1.64 2.24
 
P∗
t Uni 5 2.89 0.97 0.99 0.85 1.12 0.63 0.65 0.53 0.77
 
R∗
t Uni 5 2.89 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.18
 
ΔS
t Uni 5 2.89 0.22 0.26 0.14 0.37 0.13 0.21 0.08 0.35
 
∗
oil,t Inv.Gam 10 Inf 12.64 12.80 11.38 14.16 9.64 9.76 8.48 11.18
ρA Beta 0.5 0.2 0.88 0.87 0.82 0.91 0.77 0.72 0.61 0.84
ρB Beta 0.5 0.2 0.09 0.13 0.03 0.24 0.12 0.15 0.02 0.27
ρG Beta 0.5 0.2 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.96 0.81 0.78 0.65 0.92
ρI Beta 0.5 0.2 0.12 0.15 0.05 0.26 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.18
ρw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.36 0.35 0.17 0.53 0.26 0.26 0.08 0.41
ρG∗ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.88 0.86 0.78 0.95
ρΔS Beta 0.5 0.2 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.95 0.93 0.89 0.82 0.96
ρoil Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.88 0.87 0.80 0.9419
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Tab. 2: Benchmark model: behavioral parameter estimates.
DSGE DSGE-VAR
Param Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs A posteriori beliefs
Distribution Mean Std. Mode Mean I1 I2 Mode Mean I1 I2
φ Norm 4 0.5 4.55 4.64 3.93 5.37 4.40 4.48 3.73 5.19
ϕ Gam 0.2 0.1 0.23 0.27 0.10 0.42 0.21 0.27 0.08 0.45
σC Norm 1 0.38 0.54 0.67 0.26 1.07 0.93 1.14 0.63 1.69
σ
∗
C Norm 1 0.38 1.18 1.27 0.77 1.81 1.17 1.24 0.68 1.76
h Beta 0.7 0.1 0.83 0.82 0.73 0.91 0.82 0.80 0.69 0.92
h
∗ Beta 0.7 0.1 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.91 0.83 0.81 0.72 0.89
σL Gam 2 0.75 1.08 1.20 0.53 1.89 1.72 2.03 0.89 3.14
αH Beta 0.75 0.05 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.93
α
∗
F Beta 0.75 0.05 0.77 0.78 0.73 0.82 0.69 0.69 0.61 0.76
γH Beta 0.5 0.15 0.37 0.37 0.21 0.53 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.53
γ
∗
F Beta 0.5 0.15 0.60 0.60 0.45 0.75 0.33 0.35 0.19 0.52
αw Beta 0.75 0.05 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.90 0.80 0.79 0.74 0.85
ξw Beta 0.5 0.15 0.40 0.40 0.21 0.59 0.32 0.34 0.17 0.51
λe Beta 0.75 0.05 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.74 0.82
ρ Beta 0.75 0.1 0.86 0.86 0.82 0.90 0.80 0.79 0.73 0.84
ρ
∗ Beta 0.75 0.1 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.90
rπ Norm 1.5 0.1 1.48 1.48 1.32 1.63 1.46 1.46 1.30 1.63
r
∗
π Norm 1.5 0.1 1.37 1.38 1.21 1.54 1.46 1.46 1.28 1.63
rΔπ Gam 0.3 0.1 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.33
r
∗
Δπ Gam 0.3 0.1 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.19
rY Gam 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.13
r
∗
Y Gam 0.13 0.05 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.30 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.21
rΔY Gam 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.18
r
∗
ΔY Gam 0.06 0.05 0.29 0.30 0.24 0.36 0.28 0.29 0.20 0.37
ξ Gam 2 0.75 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.31 0.24 0.27 0.15 0.40
η
∗ Beta 0.5 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.14 0.43 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.34
η Beta 0.5 0.28 0.69 0.68 0.53 0.82 0.54 0.56 0.37 0.76
αoil Beta 0.5 0.28 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.22 cc c c
ωr Beta 0.5 0.28 0.80 0.79 0.70 0.88 0.83 0.84 0.74 0.94
λDSGE Uni 5 2.89 -- - - 1.91 1.87 1.60 2.14
Pλ(Y) -1478.2 -1351.820
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mate that the elasticity of HICP energy to oil prices is slightly higher than 0.1 while the weight of HICP
energy in total HICP is below 10%. We choose therefore to calibrate the steady state share of oil in ﬁnal
consumption to be 1% (adjusting accordingly ωC). Regarding the oil intensity of domestic production,
ωY is set so that steady state oil imports represent 1.5% of output. In doing so, approximately 60% of
steady state oil absorption serves as an intermediate input and 40% as ﬁnal consumption. Those ﬁgures
are qualitatively in line with data coming from input/output tables.
As in Smets and Wouters [2005], the priors are assumed to be the same across countries. The standard
errors of the innovations are assumed to follow uniform distributions. The prior distributions for most
of the parameters are similar to the ones of Adjemian et al. [2008] (see Tables 1 and 2). In particular,
we choose uniform priors for the open economy parameters, notably the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution and the shares of PCP producers in both countries. Concerning the size of rule-of-thumb
consumers in the euro area, ωr, and the speed of oil-revenues recycling into foreign imports, αoil,p r i o r
distributions are Beta(0.5,0.28). Finally, when the technology parameters related to oil absorption in
ﬁnal consumption and in the production of intermediate goods are estimated, we set Beta(0.5,0.28)
priors for the weights ωC and ωY ,a n dInverseGamma(0.09,2) priors for the elasticities of substitution
θo and ξo.
3.2 Posterior parameter estimates
The direct estimation results for the benchmark speciﬁcation are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Regard-
ing closed-economy parameters, our results are qualitatively similar to the ones of Smets and Wouters
[2005]andAdjemianetal.[2008]forthe euroareaexceptfor consumption preferences: the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is on the low side of available estimates while the habit persistence parameter
is relatively high. This may be partly explained by the presence of non-Ricardian households which
do not smooth their consumption intertemporally. In order to match the degree of autocorrelation for
consumption expenditures present in the data, a higher habit persistence may be required while the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution may control for the effect of the real interest rate. In terms of
asymmetry with the ROW structural parameters, we note that the degree of nominal rigidity in price-
setting is lower in the ROW while the interest rate rule is relatively more responsive to output.
The share of rule-of-thumb consumers in the euro area, 1−ωr, is estimated to be around 20%, using the
benchmark speciﬁcation which assumes that active government transfers link the disposable income of
r − type households to national income. By contrast, the posterior parameter estimate for this share is
reduced to 6% when assuming that the r − type household income ﬂuctuates like labor compensation
(see the modiﬁed r−type columns in Table 3). Our results thereforesuggest a lower size of rule-of-thumb
consumers compared with what Coenen and Straub [2005] found for the euro area. A possible explana-
tion for the different results may be related to the ﬂat priors used in the present paper, while the authors
set a Beta(0.5,0.1) prior distribution on the share of non-Ricardian households. Moreover, in Coenen
and Straub [2005], the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers tends to deteriorate the marginal data den-
sity which suggests that a looser prior on the share may have implied a lower posterior estimate.21
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Turning to the parameters driving the open economy features of the model, we note ﬁrst that the price
elasticity of trade, ξ, is estimated around 0.22 in the benchmark model. This estimate is much lower
than the one reported by Adjemian et al. [2008] in their model for the US and the euro area. This reﬂects
the fact that the size of the expenditure switching effect estimated using ROW aggregate GDP and real
effective exchange rate is presumably weaker than with US-related data. Moreover, we estimate the
share of PCP and LCP ﬁrms (given by the parameters η and η∗). For the euro area, the share of PCP
ﬁrms is around 70% while in the ROW, the share of PCP ﬁrms is lower and is centered around 30%. As
explained by Adjemian et al. [2008], those parameter estimates are quite sensitive to the choice of price
indices for the estimation. Indeed, with only CPI inﬂation observed in the ROW, the results for ROW
producers may be tilted towards the LCP case. Finally, the amount of oil-recycling into foreign imports
within a quarter, αoil, is estimated with a posterior mode at 7% and a mean at 10%.
The DSGE-VAR estimation of the benchmark model delivers similar posterior distributions for most of
the behavioral parameters. In general, posterior parameter distributions are slightly shifted towards the
priors in comparison with the direct estimation case. Note that the oil-recycling parameter αoil was not
identiﬁedin theDSGE-VARestimation so thatweconstraineditto0.1. Table3alsoreportsalternativees-
timation results based ﬁrst on the modiﬁed rule-of-thumb behavior: here again, the posterior estimates
are very close to the ones of the benchmark estimation except from the share of r − type consumers (as
already mentioned). Marginal data density comparison indicates that the benchmark speciﬁcation for
rule-of-thumb behavior is favored. The estimation of the benchmark speciﬁcation over a shorter sample
(1985Q1 to 2005Q1) also present posterior distributions similar to the ones obtained with the long sam-
ple, for most of the structural parameters. A noticeable difference regards the posterior distribution of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σC, which is signiﬁcantly higher and centered around 1.3.
Finally, we investigated the estimation of the oil technology. The results for the direct and DSGE-VAR
estimation areshown in Table 4, for both the long and short sample. In all cases, the elasticities of substi-
tution, θo and ξo, are not well-identiﬁed, the posterior distributions being similar, and almost identical
in the DSGE-VAR estimations, to the prior ones. By contrast, the weight of oil in ﬁnal consumption, ωC,
is precisely pinned down in all models at around 1%, which is also the value we used in our benchmark
calibration. This result is obtained with relatively uninformative priors, as explained earlier. The esti-
mates of the oil share as an intermediate input in production, ωY , obtained through direct estimations,
point to levels closer to our baseline calibration. However, the DSGE-VARs deliver negligible values for
ωY . Finally, when we compare the direct estimations for the long and short samples, we do not ﬁnd
evidence of lower oil intensity in production over the more recent periods. In order to improve the iden-
tiﬁcation of those parameters, more data would be needed notably on intermediate consumption of oil.
This explains why we preferred to rely on informed calibration for those parameters in the benchmark
estimation.22
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Fig. 1: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  ∗
oil,t. Benchmark model: direct estimation.23
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3.3 Assessing the oil-price macroeconomic transmission and dynamics
We turn now to the transmission of oil price shocks in the benchmark model. Figure 1 shows that a
more than 10% temporary increase in oil prices leads to 0.1 pp direct effect on euro area CPI inﬂation.
PPI inﬂation increases persistently by 0.01 pp, at a quarterly frequency. Those inﬂationary pressures
erode real wages which remain approximately at 0.1 pp below baseline over the short to medium term.
Euro area interest rate increases by a couple of basis points (at an annual rate). Regarding activity, the
maximum decline in euro area consumption and investment reaches 0.15 and 0.2 pp respectively after
3 to 5 years. The decrease in output is more limited, due notably to the recycling of oil revenues, with
a peack at more than 0.04 pp. The absorption from the oil-producing block acts as a symmetric foreign
demand shock on the euro area and the ROW, supporting output and crowding out domestic demand.
In the ROW, given more ﬂexible prices, the inﬂationary pressures induced by the oil price hike are more
pronounced leading to tighter monetary policy and stronger contraction in economic activity. The nom-
inal exchange rate of the euro appreciates marginally.
Figure 7 in the Appendix illustrates the main implications of alternative parameter estimates for the
transmission of oil-supply shocks. Starting from the benchmark case, we replace ﬁrst the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and the habit persistence with the values obtained in the short-sample estima-
tion. This leads to a more limited impact on consumption and output but ampliﬁes the contraction in
investment. The response of PPI inﬂation is more muted and the exchange rate appreciation is slightly
stronger. Second, we change the speciﬁcation of the rule-of-thumb consumer behavior, linking their
spending expenditures to labor income. Compared with the benchmark case, aggregate consumption is
less negatively affected since the substitution between oil input and labor exerts a compensating effect
on rule-of-thumb household income. But overall, the impulse response functions to oil-supply shocks
are quite robust to the various model estimations presented in this paper.
An extensive strand of literature has studied the macroeconomic propagation of oil price shocks and
we do not pretend here to provide a seriously competing model from an empirical perspective. Instead,
we introduced simple but plausible structural features describing the transmission mechanism of oil
price shocks to the euro area economy under rational expectations and tried to provide satisfying data
coherence through full-information bayesian inference. We therefore limit our comparison to selected
contributions based on DSGE models. In particular, Jacquinot et al. [2009] use empirical benchmarks to
assess their modeled transmission mechanism for oil, based on a more sophisticated description of oil-
related industry sectors than in our DGSE framework. Evidence reported in their study for the impulse
responses on euro area inﬂation is relatively similar to ours. However, the effects of oil price shocks
on economic activity obtained in the present paper lie on the low range of available estimates: they are
nonetheless close to the ones obtained with the Area-Wide-Model (see Fagan et al. [2005]) and some
SVAR results.
The DSGE-VAR approach implemented here also provides a natural framework to compare the model-
based transmission of oil prices to more "agnostic" benchmarks. In this respect, the comparison of the
DSGEandthe DSGE-VARimpulse response functions presentedin Figures 8conﬁrms that thestructural24
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model may underestimate the contractionary effects of oil prices on the euro area, notably for aggregate
output. However, such a result may also come from the rational expectations assumption which makes
monetary policy, speciﬁed as an interest rate feedback rule, very effective in stabilizing inﬂation expec-
tations and muting the second round effects of oil price shocks. To illustrate this point, we re-estimated
the DSGE-VAR allowing the central bank inﬂation target perceived by wage and price setters to be cor-
related with oil price shocks in the euro area, while the true inﬂation target is left unchanged. More
precisely, we specify the deviations of the perceived inﬂation target from steady state as follows:
πt = ρππt−1 + ρπ,oil 
∗
oil,t
The autoregressive parameter is calibrated at 0.8 while ρπ,oil is estimated. This conﬁguration is meant
to approximate a conﬁguration of weak central bank credibility, whereby sizeable markup shocks are
likely to shift private agent perceptions about the inﬂation comfort zone for the monetary authority. The
DSGE-VAR estimation delivers a posterior mode of 0.01 for ρπ,oil and the marginal data density of the
model is almost the same as in the benchmark DSGE-VAR. The transmission of oil-price shock in this
case is presented in Figure 9. The response of euro area PPI inﬂation in the DSGE is now much stronger
than in the benchmark case which leads to a more pronounced monetary policy tightening together
with a larger and more protracted decline of economic activity. Compared with the DSGE-VAR impulse
responses, the propagation mechanisms derived from the DSGE now appear much more similar. This
simple exercise emphasizes the role of expectational instability in the transmission of cost-push shocks
in general and oil prices in particular. In the present paper, we restrain our analysis to a full information
and rational expectations environment and leave such extensions for further research.
4 Monetary policy response to oil-prices
4.1 Deﬁning optimal policy and accounting for the zero lower bound
The Ramsey approach to optimal monetary policy cooperation is computed by formulating an inﬁnite-
horizon Lagrangian problem of maximizing the conditional expected social welfare subject to the full
set of non-linear constraints forming the competitive equilibrium of the model.
We are mainly interested in comparing the macroeconomic stabilization performances of different mon-
etary policy regimes within a medium scale open economy framework including a wide set of shocks
and frictions. Thus we introduce a ﬁscal intervention in the form of subsidies on labor and goods mar-
kets, in order to offset the ﬁrst order distortions caused by the presence of monopolistic competition in
the markets.
As in Adjemian et al. [2008], in order to avoid high probabilities of hitting the zero bound under the
Ramsey allocation, we introduce in households’ welfare for each country a quadratic term penalizing25
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the variance of the nominal interest rate:
WR
H,t = WH,t + λREt
∞  
j=0
βj (Rt+j − R )
2
WR






t+j − R  2
where λR and λ∗
R are the weights attached to the cost of nominal interest rate ﬂuctuations. The calibra-
tion of those parameters aims at bringing the unconditional variance of the nominal interest rates under
optimal monetary policy cooperation close to the ones obtained with the estimated rules.
Compared with Adjemian et al. [2008], the speciﬁc features of the oil price transmission and the mod-
eling framework of the present paper relate to the introduction of rule-of-thumb consumers and the
asymmetry in the currency denomination of oil prices. Indeed, while Adjemian et al. [2008]c o u l da l -
ready assess the optimal stabilization of a common markup shock at the CPI or PPI level, we account
here more precisely for the direct versus the cost channel of the shock as well as the role of exchange rate
adjustment. In addition, the eventual trade-offs between heterogenous responses of households’ types
and price stability can be explored.
We also derive some concept of optimal policy from the euro area perspective which consists in max-
imizing euro area welfare conditional on monetary policy in the ROW following the estimated Taylor
rule. Given that the structural microfoundations of the ROW block have been estimated on aggregate
data covering heterogenous economic conﬁgurations, we put into perspective the optimal international
monetary policy cooperation with optimal policy for the euro area treating the ROW block as reduced-
form. For comparison purposes, the coefﬁcient λR for the euro area optimal policy is set to be the same
as for the optimal cooperation case.
We abstract here from the analysis of non-cooperative optimal monetary policy arrangements as in Co-
enen et al. [2008]o rDe Fiore and Lombardo [2008]. The comparison with the euro area optimal policy
is only meant to illustrate the additional degrees of freedom that monetary policy could acquire with
respect to the optimal cooperation, notably through stronger exchange rate adjustments.
4.2 Optimal response to oil-price shocks
Figure 2 compares the transmission of a positive oil-price shock under the estimated Taylor rules, the
optimal monetary policy cooperation and the euro area optimal policy. The structural parameters are
drawn from the posterior distribution of the benchmark direct estimation. In comparison with the es-
timated rules, the optimal cooperation implies a more pronounced contraction in consumption, invest-
ment andoutput forthe euroarea. Afterapositive oilpriceshock, labordemand suffersfromthedecline
in economic activity but beneﬁts from a favorable substitution effect due to a higher cost of capital (in-
cluding energy prices). With the estimated rules, the substitution effects are dominant and hours rise
while the optimal cooperation generates a much weaker increase in the short term and a slight decline
in the medium term. Similarly, the decrease in real wages below baseline is larger and more persistent26
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in the optimal allocation. Overall, the optimal cooperation is substantially reducing the deviations from
the ﬂexible price allocation. We report in Figures 2, X
gap
t variables which are the percentage devia-
tions from the the ﬂexible price and wage equilibrium with no r − type consumers. The optimal policy
achieves a better stabilization of euro area output, consumption and investment gaps, and to a lesser
extent, the real wage gap.
Regarding prices, the direct effects of oil price increases on CPI inﬂation are the same under both policy
regimes. However, after a few quarters, the response of headline inﬂation appears signiﬁcantly more
muted in the optimal allocation. At the producer level, inﬂation increases only marginally under opti-
mal policy, with the response of producer prices amounting to half of that observed under the estimated
rules. Such marked differences in the stabilization outcomes are obtained with limited asymmetries
in the interest rate path: the optimal policy is slightly less restrictive than the estimated rules for the
posterior mode of the IRFs, and the distribution of short-term responses of the policy rate shows likely
occurrences of interest rate cuts in the short run for the optimal allocation. Such a similarity may partly
be due to the welfare penalty on interest rate ﬂuctuations introduced in the optimal policy program: as
shown in Adjemian et al. [2008], this constraint is very effective in controlling the optimal interest rate
volatility while marginally affecting the main stabilization properties of the optimal allocation, with the
exception of the exchange rate.
On the ROW, while the estimated rule implies a moderate increase in the policy rate, the optimal co-
operation is accommodative in the short run, therefore leading to a more pronounced appreciation of
the euro on impact. In this case, the stronger adjustment of international relative prices provides some
support to ROW output in the few quarters after the shock. Like in the euro area, the optimal policy
also achieves a better stabilization of CPI inﬂation over the medium term compared with the estimated
rule, albeit tolerating a higher inﬂation rate than in the euro area due to more ﬂexible price-setting.
Overall, the optimal monetary policy cooperation would call for a more pronounced contraction of eco-
nomic activity in the euro area in order to mitigate signiﬁcantly the inﬂation pressures at the producer
level, notably through weaker wage responses. In addition, higher interest rate differentials in the op-
timal cooperation would activate a stronger exchange rate channel to ease the underlying inﬂationary
pressures affecting the euro area. This asymmetric pattern is hardly present under the estimated rules
and results notably from the ability of the optimal monetary policy to exploit the oil-price denomination
in the ROW currency.
We now turn to the main features of the euro area optimal policy , taking as given the estimated rule for
the ROW in the maximization program of the monetary authority. Broadly speaking, euro area optimal
policy delivers macroeconomic responses which are close to the estimated rule case for the ROW and
similar to the optimal monetary policy cooperation for the euro area. Consequently, the real exchange
rate change on impact is in between the muted response under the estimated rules and the sharp appre-
ciation generated by the optimal allocation. At the margin, euro area optimal policy generates a slightly
higher responses of PPI inﬂation rates than the optimal cooperation.27
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Fig. 2: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  ∗
oil,t. Optimal cooperation (plain lines and shaded
areas), Optimal euro area (dotted lines), Estimated (dashed lines).28
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4.3 Optimal stabilization and rule-of-thumb consumers
In order to investigate further the role of household heterogeneity and the currency denomination of
oil prices for the optimal interest rate path, Figures 3 compare the impulse response functions to an oil
price shock, under optimal monetary policy cooperation and optimal policy for the euro area, with or
without r − type households. In doing so, we remove the welfare penalty on interest rate ﬂuctuations.
The constraints imposed on the optimal volatility of the policy instruments are indeed likely to mask the
implications that the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers can have on the interest rate response and
on the amplitude of exchange rate adjustments.
Aﬁrstobservation is that,the interestratepenalty affectssigniﬁcantly theshort-term responseofinterest
rates and the real exchange rate under optimal cooperation. Compared with the benchmark transmis-
sion of Figure 2, the optimal allocation calls for a substantial cut in the euro area interest rate and an
even more pronounced one in the ROW, leading to a sharp appreciation of the euro. The decline of the
euro area interest rate under the optimal policy is due to the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers since
removing them would lead to an increase of the policy rate in the very short term. Actually, the oil price
shock creates a signiﬁcant asymmetry in the consumption responses of the various households’ types
and therefore entails substantial welfare costs related to imperfect risk sharing among consumers. A
way for monetary policy to address those deﬁciencies is to lean against the abrupt fall in consumption
of rule-of-thumb consumers stemming from the immediate income effect. But in doing so, monetary
policy could deteriorate the stabilization of inﬂation both domestically and abroad. This trade-off be-
tween limiting the imperfect risk sharing across households and delivering price stability is apparent in
the comparison of the impulse responses with or without r − type households under optimal monetary
policy cooperation: the decline in euro area interest rate implies that the ROW interest rate would have
to decline more than without r − type households, but the extent of policy accommodation in the ROW
facesconstraints in terms of inﬂation volatility which limits the size of the interest ratedifferentialacross
countries and moderate the exchange rate channel that can be activated. On balance, PPI inﬂation in the
euro area is slightly more muted in the absence of rule-of-thumb consumers. In addition, the stronger
exchange rate adjustment mitigates the direct effects of the oil-price hike on euro area CPI inﬂation.
I nt h ec a s eo ft h eo p t i m a lm o n e t a r yp o l i c yf r o mt h ee u ro area perspective, the ROW interest rate follows
the estimated rule and cannot serve the purpose of optimal stabilization. When rule-of-thumb con-
sumers are present, the euro area interest rate cannot decline signiﬁcantly: given the muted response
of the ROW interest rate, a desired policy accommodation to address the heterogenous household re-
sponses inthe euroareawouldgeneratedemand-driveninﬂationary pressureswhichcouldnot becoun-
terbalancedbyexchangerateappreciation. Thereforeboth the euroareaandthe ROW interestratemove
marginally and the nominal exchange rate of the euro features a residual appreciation. Without r−type
households, the optimal policy for the euro area regains some room for manoeuvre to increase rates
in the short term and thereby to activate sizeable interest rate differentials across countries leading to
ample exchange rate adjustments. However, compared with the optimal cooperation under the same
conﬁguration, the feedback rule followed by the ROW limits the ability of the euro area monetary au-
thority to exploit the exchange rate channel.29
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Fig. 3: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  ∗
oil,t. No interest rate penalty. Optimal
cooperation (plain lines: benchmark, dotted lines: no rule-of-thumb consumers), Optimal euro area (plain and cross lines:
benchmark, dotted and cross lines: no rule-of-thumb consumers).30
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4.4 Disentangling oil-price channels
In the following, we identify several channels of oil price macroeconomic transmission and try to illus-
trate their quantitative signiﬁcance through various simulations. First, we consider the case where oil is
not used as a ﬁnal consumption good and thus the price of oil has no direct impact on CPI inﬂation. Sec-
ond, we shut down the indirect channel associated with the use of oil as an intermediate input. Finally,
by getting rid of the rule-of-thumb consumers, we mute somewhat the mechanical real income effect of
oil price changes.
We focus in this section on the historical contribution of oil price shocks to the main euro area variables
and present some sensitivity analysis with respect to the various channels through which oil prices af-
fect the economy. Here again, one should keep in mind that in our modeling framework, real oil prices
are treated as exogenous so that any ﬂuctuations could be seen as supply-driven. Acknowledging this
caveat, the purpose of the counterfactual analysis is to illustrate the difference in the stabilization prop-
erties between the estimated rules and the optimal policy cooperation using meaningful amplitudes of
oil-price ﬂuctuations. We will concentrate on the period 2004 to 2008 during which repeated oil price
surges have been recorded.
The contribution of oil price shocks to euro area CPI inﬂation, output and interest rate, under each of
these conﬁgurations, is documented in Figures 4 for both the estimated rules and the optimal monetary
policy cooperation (contribution analysis for additional variables are exposed in Figures 10 to 12 in the
Appendix). The plain lines show the transmission of oil price shocks when the structural parameters
are set to their estimated values in the benchmark estimation. Focusing on the repeated surges in oil
prices from 2004 to 2008, the model with the estimated rules evaluates the negative contribution of the
commodity price shocks on annual GDP growth for the euro area to reach 0.1 pp per year on average
over the period. The optimal monetary policy cooperation would imply a more pronounced slowdown
in economic activity, subtracting 0.3 pp of average annual GDP growth. In particular, the amplitude of
capital expenditures retrenchment would be much larger and more synchronized with consumption in
the optimal allocation. Regarding prices, the contribution of oil price shocks to inﬂationary pressures at
the producer level for the euro area has gradually reached around 0.25 pp of year-on-year PPI inﬂation
from 2005 onwards with the estimated rules. On CPI inﬂation, the direct effects of oil price increases
added another 0.3 pp on average from 2004 to 2008 to those underlying inﬂationary pressures. The euro
area wage increases consistent with such inﬂation dynamics under the estimated rules would amount to
0.25 pp of year-on-year changes on average over the period. Under optimal monetary policy, however,
t h ew a g er e s p o n s ei sm u c hm o r es u b d u e da n dt h eb u ilding-up of producer price pressures are three
times smaller. The muted underlying inﬂationary pressures are then reﬂected in lower CPI inﬂation
outcomes for the optimal allocation. Finally, the increase in euro area interest rate is slightly larger and
more persistent with the estimated rules, reaching 15 bp in 2008, but the optimal policy still generates
stronger interest rate differentials and therefore higher short term appreciation of nominal exchange
rate. Under both monetary policy regimes, the oil price surges recorded over the last 5 years would
have led to very moderate ﬂuctuations on interest rate and exchange rate.31
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Fig. 4: Contributions of historical oil price shocks to euro area output, inﬂation and interest rate.
EA output (year on year growth, in %)














































No oil input in production
No oil in consumption
EA CPI (year on year inflation, in %)





















































No oil input in production
No oil in consumption
EA Interest rate (annual rate, in %)


















































No oil input in production
No oil in consumption32
ECB
Working Paper Series No 962
November 2008
We now try to disentangle the role of the various oil price channels in explaining such different stabi-
lization properties. First we consider the conﬁguration in which oil is not used as an intermediate input,
ωY =0 . In this case, the contributions of oil price shocks to euro area macroeconomic aggregates turn
out to be strongly similar under the estimated rules and the optimal cooperation: around half of the
direct effects of oil prices on CPI inﬂation are allowed to be passed onto nominal wages through the
partial indexation scheme, which leads to some increases in PPI inﬂation. The decline of GDP growth
is then signiﬁcantly reduced to less than 0.05 pp per year from 2004 to 2008. Given the negative real
income effects and the marginal increases in non-energy prices, interest rate are even decreased by few
basis points over the period. Overall, the estimated euro area interest rate rule targeting GDP inﬂation
and detrended output seems to implement an economic allocation very close to the optimal one when
oil is only used as a ﬁnal consumption good. The optimal policy tells us that there is no need to coun-
teract the direct inﬂationary effects of oil price shocks as well as their impact on wage due to backward
indexation provided that those inﬂationary pressures do not get entrenched in PPI inﬂation.
If the differences in the oil price transmission between the estimated rules and the optimal cooperation
arenot drivenby the ﬁnal-consumption oil channel, the intermediateinput channel isinstead explaining
most of the divergences. When removing oil prices from ﬁnal consumption, setting ωC =0 , we observe
asymmetric wage responses under both policies: from 2004 to 2008, wages would have increased by
0.2 pp annually under the estimated rules while the optimal monetary policy cooperation would have
induced a decrease in nominal wages by less than 0.1 pp. This leads to much more limited price pres-
sures at the producer and consumer levels in the optimal allocation. The gap in the size of the economic
contraction induced by the different monetary policy settings is also widenning. Note that, by muting
the direct effects of oil price on CPI, we mitigated the real income channel from the rule-of-thumb con-
sumer behavior. This explains why in this case, the output decline is more driven by investment than
consumption compared with the benchmark conﬁguration. Overall, the inﬂationary forces emanating
from the intermediate consumption of oil are strongly counteracted by optimal policy, which induces
dampening pressures on wages in order to mitigate the cost channel of oil prices. This feature contrasts
with the tolerance for a positive wage response under the estimated rules.
A ﬁnal dimension of oil price transmission explored in this section regards the size of r − type con-
sumer and the mechanical real income effect. When setting ωr =0 , we observe limited modiﬁcations
on the nominal side of the euro area economy, under both policy regimes. At the margin, the optimal
allocation achieves a slightly lower contribution of oil price hikes from 2004 to 2008 on PPI and wage
inﬂation. However, on economic activity, the absence of rule-of-thumb consumers allows optimal policy
to be more restrictive and to amplify the adjustment on investment and then GDP while the contribu-
tions to consumption are similar to the benchmark case. Under the estimated rules, the implications
on the real effects of oil price shocks mainly concern the timing of the consumption response which is
delayed compared with the benchmark transmission.33
ECB
Working Paper Series No 962
November 2008
Fig. 5: Loss function simulations: comparison of CPI versus CPI excluding energy inﬂation targeting.
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4.5 The costs of ﬁne-tuning policies
The experiments conducted in the previous section are illustrative of the magnitude of the effects that
one could expect from oil price developments, should monetary policy beneﬁt from a high level of cred-
ibility and manage to optimally steer expectations. Broadly speaking, monetary policy prevents the
emergence of entrenched inﬂationary effects, while looking through the short-term impacts on headline
inﬂation. The medium-term orientation of monetary policy strategy in the central banking community
clearly advises against excessive ﬁne-tuning of macroeconomic variables, including inﬂation. Such ﬁne-
tuning would be costly for a central bank. Thereafter we intend to illustrate this point.
Let us consider the following monetary policy settings for the euro area which minimize an intertempo-
ral loss function, given the structural equilibrium conditions describing the world economy and subject
to the constraint that ROW monetary policy follows the estimated interest rate rule.
The loss function considered can be written as follows:
LH,t = λππ2
t + λπNπ2





where λπ, λπN, λy and λr are the coefﬁcients weighting the respective costs of volatility in CPI inﬂation,
CPI excluding energy inﬂation, changes in the model-based output gap and nominal interest rate. We
set λy = λr = 0.5 and then vary each weight on a nominal inﬂation indicator from 0 to ∞, setting the
other term to zero. For any loss function, we derive the stochastic allocation and compare the standard
deviations of selected euro area variables.
Figure 5 shows the trade-off curves implied by the two sets of monetary policy: one targeting CPI inﬂa-
tion and output gap, the other targeting CPI inﬂation excluding energy and output gap. The ﬁrst chart
plots the volatility of PPI inﬂation against the volatility of the output gap for both classes of policy. It ap-
pears that the strict headline inﬂation targeting would imply higher PPI inﬂation variance and stronger
ﬂuctuations in the output gap. The same would be true for the nominal interest rate and nominal ex-
change rate as shown in the second chart of Figures 5. Unambiguously, the ﬁne-tuning strategy which
consists in trying to counteract mechanically the direct effects of oil-price changes in headline inﬂation
proves counterproductive. The direct effects of sectoral price changes (measured by the difference be-
tween the headline inﬂation and inﬂation excluding the sectoral item) can only be counteracted at the
cost of excessive ﬂuctuations in real quantities and a stronger response in underlying inﬂation.
4.6 Optimal monetary policy response to a permanent expected change in the rela-
tive price of oil
A ﬁnal exercise conducted in this paper deals with the implications of the expected versus the unex-
pected nature of oil-price ﬂuctuations. The repeatedsurges in energy costs recordedsince the beginning
of the century have been to a large extent unexpected by the vast majority of market participants. This
is notably attested by the progressive upward shift in oil futures following the series of hikes in spot35
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Fig. 6: Deterministic simulations: Expected versus Unexpected 100% increase in steady state real oil
prices,spreadovera5-yearperiod. Comparisonwith theno oilin productioncase. EAvariables, deviation
from steady state, in %. Time unit = quarter.
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prices. We consider here a counterfactual experiment exploring the appropriate monetary policy con-
duct should economic agents have foreseen a dramatic increase in oil prices over an extended period of
time. Under optimal monetary policy cooperation, we comparethe economic consequences of a stylized
100% permanent increase in oil prices spread over ﬁve years, depending on whether the future oil price
path has been fully anticipated or results from a succession of unanticipated oil-supply shocks.
Figure 5 presents the impulse responses for selected variables for the euro area, under the benchmark
parameter set, and in the no-oil-in-production case. In the benchmark conﬁguration, a ﬁrst observation
is that the correct anticipation of future oil price changes leads to a dramatically different wage path:
nominal wage declines by 0.05 pp on average during the ﬁrst three years while in the unexpected case,
monetary policy allows upside surprises in CPI inﬂation to be passed on labor costs through backward
indexation. Moreover, perfect foresight on future oil price increases generates a front loading of inﬂa-
tionary pressures at the producer level, which materializes only later in the unexpected scenario. The
combination of lower wage response and faster pick-up in PPI inﬂation strongly reduces the real wage
gap when oil price increases are fully anticipated. Nominal interest rate declines below baseline by less
than 20 bp in the fully anticipated case while the interest rate move is on the upside and more gradual
when the oil price ﬂuctuations are not expected. The exchange rate appreciates by more in the expected
case. Overall, the perfect foresight on the oil price path leads to a more rapid absorption of the steady
state decline in purchasing power and real national income. Through the various expectation channels,
economic agents facilitate the necessary adjustments in real income and aggregate demand. Optimal
monetary policy can tolerate the direct effects of oil price changes on CPI inﬂation as well as some de-
gree of underlying inﬂationary pressures in the view of easing partly the burden of downward real
wage shifts. Under rational expectations, the optimal policy transmission suggests that the anticipation
of future oil price surges does not create a case to curb the direct inﬂationary effects of oil price shocks.
We now conduct some sensitivity analysis around the previous deterministic simulations by consider-
ing a conﬁguration where oil is not used as intermediate input. In this case, the differences in economic
transmission of expected versus unexpected oil price shocks are less pronounced than in the benchmark
exercise. In particular, wage inﬂation rises in the expected case, albeit to a lower extent than in the unex-
pectedcase. A key differencewith the benchmark transmission is that the realwage gap to close is much
narrower: when oil is used in production, oil prices exert pressures on the overall cost of capital which
would lead to an opposite move for real labor costs along the factor price frontier, if prices and wages
were ﬂexible. Consequently, some nominal wage growth can be tolerated. And, as previously noticed,
some PPI inﬂation materializes which contributes to limit the opening of a real wage gap. Under perfect
foresight, the inﬂation pressures are front loaded compared with the unexpected case. Turning to inter-
est rates, monetary policy is more restrictive when the oil price increases are anticipated. The reverse
was true in the benchmark simulations. Overall, those simulations illustrate that the assumptions made
on the technology structure related to oil are crucial dimensions for monetary policy analysis, which
can lead to signiﬁcantly different prescriptions depending on the expected versus unexpected nature of
commodity price changes.37
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5C o n c l u s i o n
Allinall, this paperpresentsanextension toexisting medium-scaleopen-economy DSGEmodels, which
have been successfully brought to euro area data, by including some relevant features of the macroeco-
nomic transmission of oil-price shocks. But the ultimate goal of this contribution has been to explore
the monetary policy prescriptions coming from a welfare-maximizing policy setting, within a modeling
framework providing appropriate data coherence.
It turns out that the optimal policy conduct, while being undoubtedly geared towards delivering price
stability over the medium term after oil-price shocks, is tolerating their direct inﬂationary effects on
headline inﬂation and do not advocate ﬁne-tuning actions to stabilize short-term volatility in CPI in-
ﬂation. At the same time, the optimal allocation clearly suggests that wages should feature a muted
response after oil-price shocks. This will facilitate the necessary downward adjustment in real labor
costs and counterbalance the cost pressures stemming from the intermediate use of oil in production.
Our monetary policy prescriptions have been derived in a modeling framework where oil-price ﬂuctua-
tions areessentially exogenous to policy actions andwhere privatesector expectations areformedunder
the rational expectations paradigm. Notably, the extent to which such conclusions could be extended to
imperfect knowledge as well as weak central bank credibility conﬁgurations remain challenging ﬁelds
for further research.38
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A Model description
This section presents ﬁrst order conditions associated with the decision problems of section 2.
A.1 o − type households























(1+τC,t) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
The ﬁrst order conditions associated with contingent bond holdings, combined with the ones of country

















0 (normalized to 1 given our steady state assumptions). The previ-
ous equation is derived from the set of optimality conditions that characterize the optimal allocation
of wealth among state-contingent securities. εΔS
t is a unitary-mean disturbance affecting the optimal
risk sharing condition. The introduction of such a shock is obviously arbitrary but is meant to help
matching exchange rate ﬂuctuations in the estimation. Taking the one-period ahead expectation of the
log-differenceof this equation results in a ﬁrst order approximation of the uncovered-interest-rateparity





appears as a residual term.












where Rt is the one-period-ahead nominal interest rates for country H.













































































(1+τC,t)Qt is the lagrange multiplier associated with the capital accumulation equation
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A.2 r − type households
In the country H, with an active government policy to redistribute national income, the rule-of-thumb
households will set consumption at:
Cr
t =( 1− τW,t)wtLt +   TTr
t (8)
where   TTr
t can be an active government transfer scheme which provides the r − type consumers with
disposable income homogenous to national income minus a ﬁxed payment which ensures that con-
sumption is equalized between households’ types in the steady state.
A.3 Labour supply and wage-setting by unions











































2,t =( 1 − τw,t)(ωrΛ
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where wt denotes the aggregate real wage (measured with the before-tax CPI), and Λr
t is the marginal































































t +( 1− ωr)Λ o
t)wt
The real wage is equal to a markup
(1+τC,t)μw
(1-τw,t) over the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and labor.42
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A.4 Firms
Cost minimization in the non-oil distribution sector gives:.
YH,t = nt (TH,t)
−ξ Yt (13)






















Similarly, costs minimization implies the following allocation of aggregate consumption among the two
g o o d sa sf o l l o w s
Coil,t = ωC (Toil,t)
−ξo Ct (17)
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Similarly, the inﬂation dynamics of LCP export prices for the country H, ˜ Π∗
H,t, is described by the fol-
lowing three equations
˜ Z∗






















































































LCP export price inﬂation for country F, ˜ ΠF,t, is given by the equivalent formulation





























































Moreover, cost minimization implies that input ratios are equalized across ﬁrms in each country. Ag-
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A.5 Market clearing conditions
Aggregatesupply of consumption goodsis equalto theweightedaverageof thecorrespondingvariables
for each consumer type
Ct = ωrC
r






t +( 1− ω∗
r)Co∗
t (42)
Aggregate investment and capital stocks are given by
It =( 1 − ωr)Io
t (43)
Kt =( 1 − ωr)Ko
t (44)
I∗










Overall demand for oil is
Yoil,t = Coil,t + Voil,t (47)
Y ∗
oil,t = C∗
oil,t + V ∗
oil,t (48)
Aggregate domestic demands for non-oil goods are given by
YN,t = CN,t + It + Gε
G





























































Given the oil-recycling demand addressed to country H and F
































market clearing conditions in the intermediate-goods markets lead to the following relations
Zt =Δ H,tYH,t +Δ ∗
H,tY ∗


















































df measure price dispersions among products of country H and F, sold locally or ex-
ported.
Those indexes have the following dynamics
















































H,t = ηΔH,t +( 1− η) ˜ Δ∗
H,t (61)
˜ Δ∗






























F,t +( 1− η
∗)Δ F,t (63)


















Finally, some relative prices have ﬁnally to be deﬁned as a function of stationary variables. First, the
4 inﬂation rates for export prices and local sales prices determine 3 relative prices: 2 relative export
margins for LCP producers and interior terms of trade for country H.
R ˜ ERH,t = R ˜ ERH,t−1
˜ Π∗
H,t (1 + ΔSt)
ΠH,t
(65)
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The following variables are deduced from the previous three relative prices.
RERH,t =
 







































































Given the exogenous relative price of oil in country F, T ∗










































The aggregate conditional welfare for each country are deﬁned by WH,t =
  1
0 Wt(h)dh and WF,t =
  1
0 Wt(f)df.
We already mentioned that all households have the same consumption plans. Consequently, making47
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The welfare for country F is determined by the analogous relations.
A.7 Competitive equilibrium and Ramsey formulation of optimal monetary policy
The competitive equilibrium is a set of stationary 41 processes for country H, Λo
t, Co






t , Zt, Ct, Lt, wt, Hw
1,t, Hw
2,t, Δw,t, Vt, Voil,t, Coil,t, CN,t, Yoil,t, YN,t, YH,t, Y ∗
H,t, OH,t, MCt,
Rk






H,t, ΠN,t, Πt as well as the analogous 28
processesfor country F,13 relativeprices R ˜ ERH,t, R ˜ ERF,t, RERH,t, RERF,t, Tt, T ∗
t , TH,t, T ∗
F,t ,RERX,t,
TN,t, T ∗
N,t, RERt, Toil,t and the depreciation rate ΔSt. The 96 stationary processes satisfy the relations
(1)-(84) and the analogous of equations (1), (2)-(12), (84) for country F, given the policy rates Rt, R∗
t,













t , the relative oil price in country F, T ∗




−1, ΔH,−1, ˜ Δ∗
H,−1, ΠH,−1, ˜ Π∗
H,−1, Δw,−1,w −1, analogous initial conditions for country F,
and R ˜ ERH,−1, R ˜ ERF,−1, T−1.
As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2005], we assume that the monetary authorities have been operating
for an inﬁnite number of periods and will honor commitments made in the past when choosing their
optimal policies. This form of policy commitment is similar to the notion of optimality from a timeless
perspective in the sense of Woodford [2003]
We deﬁne the Ramsey policy as the monetary policies under commitment which maximize the joint sum
of intertemporal households’ welfare for country H and country F. Formally, the Ramsey equilibrium
is a set of 96 processes deﬁned in the competitive equilibrium for t ≥ 0 that maximize
WWorld,0 = WH,0 + WF,0
subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions (1)-(84) and the analogous of equations (1), (2)-(12),
(84)for country F, ∀t  − ∞ , given exogenous stochastic processes and the initial values of the variables
listed above datedt ≺ 0, as well as the values of the Lagrangemultipliers associatedwith the constraints
listed above dated t ≺ 0.48
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Consumption expenditure growth 0*
Investment growth 0*
Producer price inflation 3* 1972Q4* 1984Q1* 1993Q2*
Consumer price inflation 3 1972Q4 1985Q1* 1994Q1
Real wage growth 0*
Nominal short-term interest rate 1* 1995Q4*
ROW variables
Output growth 0*
Consumer price inflation 0*
Relative oil price 0*
Nominal short-term interest rate 1* 1991Q3*
Dates
Note: * indicates robustness to a different parametrisation of the bandwidth used for the computation HAC 
variance. 
The test does not allow for the break to be in the first or last 7 quarters and imposes at least 7 quarters 
between two breaks.49
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Tab. 3: Alternative models 1: behavioral parameter estimates.
Param. modiﬁed r − type modiﬁed r − type Bench. short sample Bench. short sample
DSGE DSGE-VAR DSGE DSGE-VAR
Mean I1 I2 Mean I1 I2 Mean I1 I2 Mean I1 I2
φ 4.76 4.01 5.44 4.40 3.66 5.24 4.27 3.56 5.02 4.16 3.40 4.88
ϕ 0.27 0.11 0.42 0.29 0.11 0.50 0.23 0.09 0.37 0.23 0.05 0.40
σC 0.49 0.22 0.78 1.07 0.45 1.62 1.29 0.73 1.80 1.31 0.77 1.85
σ
∗
C 1.30 0.72 1.78 1.19 0.67 1.63 1.23 0.73 1.73 1.13 0.60 1.65
h 0.85 0.80 0.91 0.79 0.68 0.89 0.81 0.73 0.90 0.77 0.68 0.87
h
∗ 0.82 0.73 0.91 0.81 0.71 0.92 0.79 0.68 0.91 0.75 0.61 0.90
σL 1.28 0.59 1.99 2.01 0.79 3.12 1.37 0.60 2.07 1.83 0.67 2.92
αH 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.90 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.88 0.85 0.92
α
∗
F 0.77 0.73 0.82 0.68 0.61 0.76 0.74 0.68 0.79 0.72 0.63 0.80
γH 0.36 0.20 0.53 0.37 0.19 0.55 0.49 0.30 0.68 0.37 0.18 0.57
γ
∗
F 0.60 0.45 0.75 0.37 0.17 0.54 0.56 0.39 0.74 0.33 0.16 0.49
αw 0.88 0.84 0.91 0.80 0.75 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.88 0.77 0.71 0.83
ξw 0.40 0.21 0.59 0.33 0.16 0.49 0.34 0.16 0.50 0.29 0.12 0.45
λe 0.81 0.78 0.85 0.78 0.75 0.82 0.78 0.74 0.82 0.76 0.71 0.80
ρ 0.86 0.82 0.89 0.79 0.74 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.88 0.77 0.71 0.85
ρ
∗ 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.88 0.85 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.84 0.91
rπ 1.47 1.33 1.63 1.44 1.32 1.60 1.48 1.31 1.65 1.47 1.31 1.62
r
∗
π 1.38 1.21 1.55 1.47 1.31 1.64 1.41 1.26 1.56 1.49 1.32 1.65
rΔπ 0.22 0.16 0.30 0.26 0.17 0.33 0.23 0.14 0.33 0.23 0.14 0.32
r
∗
Δπ 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.19
rY 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.14
r
∗
Y 0.21 0.13 0.29 0.14 0.07 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.19
rΔY 0.19 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.09 0.21 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.06 0.19
r
∗
ΔY 0.30 0.24 0.36 0.29 0.22 0.36 0.31 0.23 0.39 0.26 0.15 0.36
ξ 0.23 0.14 0.31 0.30 0.16 0.43 0.26 0.16 0.36 0.29 0.17 0.43
η
∗ 0.27 0.13 0.41 0.21 0.06 0.38 0.20 0.07 0.33 0.16 0.00 0.29
η 0.67 0.52 0.82 0.51 0.33 0.72 0.79 0.67 0.91 0.78 0.63 0.96
αoil 0.09 0.01 0.18 cc c 0.09 0.00 0.17 cc c
ωr 0.94 0.89 1.00 0.97 0.93 1.00 0.83 0.71 0.95 0.83 0.72 0.95
λDSGE -- - 1.87 1.60 2.13 -- - 2.38 2.04 2.75
Pλ(Y) -1483 -1357.2 -932.8 -840.150
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Tab. 4: Alternative models 2: estimated oil-input technology, behavioral parameter estimates.
Param. Full sample. Full sample. Short sample Short sample
DSGE DSGE-VAR DSGE DSGE-VAR
Mean I1 I2 Mean I1 I2 Mean I1 I2 Mean I1 I2
φ 4.63 3.90 5.33 4.37 3.64 5.11 4.24 3.50 4.97 4.17 3.39 4.97
ϕ 0.27 0.10 0.43 0.25 0.07 0.42 0.28 0.10 0.45 0.23 0.06 0.39
σC 0.67 0.24 1.12 1.17 0.64 1.71 1.26 0.74 1.76 1.32 0.81 1.83
σ
∗
C 1.27 0.74 1.77 1.25 0.69 1.81 1.23 0.69 1.72 1.13 0.59 1.66
h 0.86 0.82 0.91 0.81 0.74 0.90 0.82 0.75 0.89 0.77 0.67 0.87
h
∗ 0.83 0.74 0.91 0.79 0.67 0.92 0.79 0.68 0.89 0.75 0.60 0.91
σL 1.18 0.52 1.82 2.04 0.88 3.16 1.24 0.56 1.91 1.88 0.65 2.97
αH 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.89 0.85 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.88 0.84 0.92
α
∗
F 0.78 0.73 0.82 0.67 0.60 0.75 0.74 0.68 0.80 0.70 0.61 0.79
γH 0.37 0.21 0.54 0.35 0.15 0.55 0.49 0.31 0.68 0.36 0.17 0.55
γ
∗
F 0.60 0.44 0.75 0.35 0.18 0.51 0.56 0.38 0.74 0.31 0.14 0.47
αw 0.87 0.84 0.90 0.79 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.88 0.77 0.71 0.83
ξw 0.39 0.21 0.58 0.35 0.18 0.53 0.34 0.16 0.51 0.30 0.13 0.46
λe 0.81 0.78 0.85 0.78 0.74 0.82 0.79 0.74 0.83 0.76 0.71 0.81
ρ 1.47 1.31 1.64 1.46 1.29 1.63 1.48 1.32 1.65 1.48 1.32 1.65
ρ
∗ 1.37 1.21 1.54 1.46 1.30 1.61 1.40 1.22 1.56 1.48 1.31 1.63
rπ 0.21 0.15 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.33 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.23 0.14 0.33
r
∗
π 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.18
rΔπ 0.86 0.82 0.90 0.79 0.73 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.88 0.78 0.71 0.85
r
∗
Δπ 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.87 0.84 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.94 0.88 0.84 0.91
rY 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.15
r
∗
Y 0.21 0.13 0.30 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.13 0.05 0.20
rΔY 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.17 0.11 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.19
r
∗
ΔY 0.30 0.23 0.36 0.29 0.20 0.37 0.31 0.23 0.39 0.26 0.15 0.35
ξ 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.27 0.16 0.38 0.27 0.16 0.36 0.29 0.16 0.41
η
∗ 0.28 0.13 0.43 0.20 0.02 0.36 0.21 0.08 0.34 0.18 0.00 0.32
η 0.68 0.55 0.83 0.55 0.35 0.75 0.78 0.65 0.91 0.77 0.59 0.96
αoil 0.15 0.00 0.31 -- - 0.06 0.01 0.11 ---
ωr 0.81 0.72 0.90 0.85 0.75 0.95 0.84 0.73 0.95 0.84 0.73 0.96
θo 0.18 0.02 0.46 0.10 0.02 0.19 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.47 0.02 1.26
ξo 0.09 0.02 0.19 0.56 0.02 1.15 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.23 0.02 0.56
ωC 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ωY 2E-03 0E+00 5E-03 5E-04 0E+00 1E-03 3E-03 1E-03 5E-03 2E-03 0E+00 5E-03
λDSGE -- - 1.87 1.59 2.14 --- 2.37 2.01 2.74
Pλ(Y) -1488.3 -1356.3 -940.6 -851.351
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Fig. 7: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  ∗
oil,t. Benchmark (plain lines), σC and h at their
short-sample estimation values (dotted and cross lines), modiﬁed r − type speciﬁcation (dashed and circle lines).52
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Fig. 8: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  ∗
oil,t. Benchmark model: DSGE-V AR
estimation. DSGE (plain lines and shaded areas), DSGE-V AR (dotted lines).53
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Fig. 9: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  ∗
oil,t. DSGE (plain lines and shaded areas), DSGE-
V AR (dotted lines): weak anchoring of private long term inﬂation expectations .54
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Fig. 10: Contributions of historical oil price shocks to euro area macroeconomic aggregates 1.
EA output (year on year growth, in %)
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Fig. 11: Contributions of historical oil price shocks to euro area macroeconomic aggregates 2.
EA CPI (year on year inflation, in %)
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Fig. 12: Contributions of historical oil price shocks to euro area macroeconomic aggregates 3.
EA Interest rate (annual rate, in %)
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